V. The lifeworld’s structure of realities– nature as abstract core-layer of the world

No. 26

The natural concept of the world.

<Systematic deconstruction of the concrete experiential world to the abstract core-layer “nature” beginning with the concrete experiential world.>[[1]](#footnote-1)

<§ 1. The task of exposing the Apriori of the concrete experiential world, and the idea of an abstractive procedure for the reconstruction of its complete concretion>

The “natural world-concept” – the necessary eidetic structure of a surrounding world in general with relation to a subjectivity as such being eidetic itself, inseparable from it [from the surrounding world], which in relation to it <is> a subjectivity for which the world is there as its surrounding world, existent in a widest sense, experienced, experienceable, and [which] at the same time is a subjectivity belonging to the world itself as being within it.

We can also designate the doubleness thus: The subjectivity is at once **immersing itself into the world** (experiencing into it, cognizing or else valuing into it, grasping [into], fearing [into], caring [into it], suffering due to it, being made happy by it, in manifold ways acting into it), and at the same time [the subjectivity is] **existent in the world**, existent for itself and [for] the others, experienced and experienceable within the respective ways of experience of the reflection. Both is connected at once by the subjectivity on the one hand being **[260] an acting subject** in the widest sense (and thus subject for all kinds of position-takings, ways of acting), and on the other hand being a **treated** (valued, etc.) **object**, treated as an inner-worldly being.

When speaking of the “**natural**”, or rather, the **necessary idea of the world** we mean the world the way it is experienced in human experience, that is, purely as an experienced one, the world of “**pure experience**”. We contrast the experiencing and the theorizing determining, and we ask for that experiential world **proceeding** in each good or bad theorizing, and in every other changing interpreting, grasping as this or that.[[2]](#footnote-2) Thus we ask for a world’s experiential shape as such (or rather, of the world common to us all) being cognizable as essentially necessary, which simply is pre-existent **in a necessary way**, is at the basis, if the subjectivity proceeds to consider the [world] experienced by it at all, to interpret it in this or that way, in detail or as the whole world.

Let us make a sense-investigative halt within our experiencing life, like evidentially we are able to, considering that which is given by experiencing, that is, the given grasped in its selfhood within the consciousness of the being-there-itself. We try to gain pure possibilities and in relation to them [we try to gain] the continuous essential universalities by the method of eidetic generalization, in a freely varying way. Thereby we can proceed in different ways in order to establish a “**transcendental doctrine of experience**”.

1) The world is a world for **us**, the [world] experienced by **us**. And as that it is given itself in reflective experience; it is, as we have to add, given as **the** world in the harmony of our experiences ever again establishing itself, while excluding possible single discordancies. More precisely: I, the one reflecting, consider the world; it is **my** surrounding world as given to **my** experience; and insofar as I know myself to be one with “others”, in actual and possible comprehension, [with others] known and unknown in “open infinity”, the world is accepted by me as being **common to us all**. I retain this de facto correlation “we and our world”, and I consider by freely varying it within the thereby predelineated identity in the variation what in general belongs to a common **[261]** (possible communicative) subjectivity, and to the surrounding world in general, or to a world in general as surrounding world of a communicative subjectivity.

I cognize that it may belong to the essence of this relation that indeed the subjects can possibly be sleeping, but that they necessarily must be able to be awake, and cannot always be sleeping if we shall be able to speak of their world. If it was not **actually** an experiential world, it was not a **surrounding world** for these subjects at all, - whereby it is always presupposed that along with it we take the allness of subjects being in possible comprehension with each other.

Now it is an eidetic insight that this subjectivity is not only actually related to the world with regard to that which is experienced, but also that awake subjectivity is and has to be in a different way active subjectivity. (That the subjectivity cannot always be sleeping is not a merely empty possibility.) Therefore it is also an eidetic insight that the surrounding world <is> **in place** not merely in general by way of experiencing and furthermore as experienceable, but that it <is> [a surrounding world] **shaping** itself in a different way through the manifold activity of the subjects, <through the activity of a subjectivity which> is directed towards it, busying <itself> with it, [being] occupied with it, and thereby conferring to it a new shape, new properties; that is, this shall be meant in such a way that the harmoniously experienced world as such gives itself in this experience as being shaped by subjectivity in such and such a way, and again newly shaped: that it is itself experienced within experience as being equipped with this and that “sense” which is experienced as either developing anew from the activity and having developed, or points back to such a subjective-active origin.

Is it possible that the subjectivity’s surrounding world was given without any shaping, and [that] it [the subjectivity] just then began shaping it? But the variation shall yield, which possibilities as such do exist here, pure, eidetic possibilities. Thereby we can proceed from here in such a way that we consider, starting from the fact of universal experience concerning the surrounding world with its subjects and subject’s activities: Whenever a subject and the manifold subjects want to act in a worldly way, a world is necessarily already **pre-given** to them, whatever its specialty may be like. Which **experience-formations** does a surrounding world in general **[262]** have, and in apriori necessity as **practical surrounding world** (“practical” in the widest sense, as being shaped by a subjectivity belonging to it itself as being within it and acting into it, living into it)? Of course this correlatively leads to the question: How is a subjectivity, related to the surrounding world, necessarily acting, and respectively being able to act in its single subjects and in its communities, and thereby creating along its surrounding world? – It needs to be heeded thereby that the subjectivity is a subjectivity of the surrounding world itself, that thus also the formation of communities, also of each social acting and performing, and eventually also the self-formation, the self-shaping, in which the single Ego enters a community with itself, and in a certain way also the community belong into the universality of the question.

In this research the world is always already presupposed, and structural concepts are formed as pure concepts from acts, from the practical shapes emerging as necessary [shapes] – as necessarily actual and necessarily possible – and which have their necessary set of types. All set of types belonging to the surrounding world coming into consideration is gained from the eidetic consideration of the practical life and of the practical life-world, at first from consideration of what presents itself from there in viewing this world, [and] according to the set of types as that which is “**ever again**” and **everywhere** given, and presents [itself] under the point of view of a form developed from the active aliveness of the subjects as a world <having> a “meaning”, i.e., which has unities of experience coming from such an activity. Of course also the perceiving, in general the experiencing, cognizing, stating, in general the verbal activity belong there, insofar as it shapes the character of the “known” and “universally known” in contrast to the unknown, foreign. The valuing activity intertwines with it, etc.

2) If the mutual relatedness of subjectivity and surrounding world hereby yields a **necessary structural** **system for each surrounding world as such,** as one of a communicative subjectivity, then thereby it is **not yet** stated that we thereby gain **the whole apriori structural** **system** of a possible experiential world of a communicative subjectivity, and that not a whole world-structure with an *a priori* self-contained structural system is presupposed, without a world-related **[263]** internal or external doing being able to have any concrete substrate. **All practice produces a formation by forming some practical material**. This may be already formed itself, and thus *in infinitum*. With this “*in infinitum*” we get into trouble,[[3]](#footnote-3) if we, like it happened up till now, always relate to the open endless communicative subjectivity, and presuppose it, what possibly comes out to belong to the essential necessities itself, as generation line endlessly reproducing itself, into which each individual is born and grows. We may not overlook thereby that the one born into it in the typical form “child” first of all has to acquire the all-common surrounding world of the “adults”, and that there may be nothing endlessly open within the single Ego.

This points out that we have to relate “communicative” (“social”) and “single-subjective” in the right way. The exertion of a program of complete apriori consideration of structures starting from the practical field has its difficulties in the determination of limits and presuppositions of its viewed Apriori.

Anyway, an itself eidetically predelineated systematic of the tasks and of the intermingling apriori structures as presupposition and limiting the presupposed is hereby needed. Each procedure is, as can be discerned, necessarily one-sided; and this one-sidedness is grounded on each experienced concretion being necessarily experienced in a one-sided way, that is, especially in the sense that “to experience” means: to experience in a preferred perspective, and to grasp what lies in this direction, and then to vary in the eidetic method. But from this taken into active variation of the givennesses lying in another perspective, differs that [taken from] concretion of what <is> motivating as not grasped, and possibly not yet explicated horizon in empty anticipation, what is not yet within the field of view itself as field of that which is ready for perception (of what is to be grasped in an attentively perceiving way).

That which remains as not being attentively perceived, grasped within the attentively perceiving active experience, which so to say thus remains unreckoned, is undetermined in it; and in a special sense it is variable within the eidetic consideration **[264]** although it is not actively varied in the pure Whatever [sic!]. It is **variable** in the sense of that which **remains open-undetermined**, whereby the way it is necessarily a part, and possibly is bound by necessities, still lacks fixing. This openness does not disturb the possibility of gaining an Apriori relating to the currently varied, and being related with insight to this variation. But then the Apriori has an open horizon for further to be gained apriori insights. Thus also the geometrical Apriori is afflicted with undetermined horizons. A possible figure cannot possibly only be as figure; but the perspective of the geometrician only is directed towards a figure and leaves open that which qualifies the figure, thereby [he leaves] open the Apriori belonging to it, being out of the question, - however intermingling necessities are connected to the geometrical ones.

Thereby follows: The abstraction of **nature** is possible in such a way that the abstraction of the geometrical space is possible (whereby this of course belongs to that abstraction). A structural self-contained Apriori is limited by the ground for a closed science being formed within the possible fact, that is, in complete independence of the Apriori belonging to the concrete world in its meanings, and to the other world in general, also to the abstractively excluded personal subjectivity. Independence of course in the sense of an **abstraction**. In contrast to that, if we are searching for the **Apriori of the concrete experiential world** we do not have such an independently to be considered structure. The attitude towards the “practical” surrounding world provides a universal Apriori of structures belonging to a mentally meaningful world and to a surrounding world in general (as necessarily being mentally meaningful); but there we necessarily deal with the subjects at the same time as being active, and with their actions being worldly themselves; and nature is, although [it is] not purified by deconstruction, a structure coming into play as well, which constantly is spoken of, it simply has not exposed its pure closed Apriori.

In order to gain the **complete Apriori of the experienceable surrounding world**, taken in its complete concretion, we have to choose a consciously **abstractive procedure** which systematically views the **structural layers**, grasps them abstractively for itself, but thereby makes itself constantly certain of the correlative abstractions, in order to be able **[265]** so to say to build the whole abstraction of the concretion. In other words: The concretions are questioned from a first, random or essentially preferred straight perspective as to their “horizons”, and to the implied determinable indeterminacies, and their necessary structural forms. In this regard several abstractions become necessary whereby another task can be to find out, in how far it respectively is an abstraction in the essential sense (pointing towards necessary essential connections, essential conditionalities of the supplement).

<§ 2. The sorted abstractive deconstruction of all subjective of the concrete experiential world for the purpose of gaining mere nature: the deconstruction of the predicates of mental meaning, of the emotions’ and values’ predicates, of the characters of mood, of the subjective ways of appearance as well as the deconstruction of the bodily animate beings experiencing the world to organisms>

How shall we perform systematic abstraction, dismember the concrete world according to its whole set of structural types which possibly emerges, into structural layers with relatively closed essential content and essential laws? We also call this abstractive procedure “**deconstruction**” **of the concrete world**, the first goal of which we designate as **deconstruction of all intentionally mental and merely subjective** in order to abstractively gain **mere nature**. This is the theme of the physical natural sciences within the facticity, and eidetically of the ontology of the mere – physical – nature.

1) The first standing out as the most general within the concrete surrounding world, and – as it seems – as structurally essential, is the differentiation between **subjects**[[4]](#footnote-4) and **non-subjects** (**things**, as we say in short), regardless of the subjects being communalized or not being communalized, <whether> the things are isolated or connected in groups, or [whether] even all <are> connected with each other to a closed endless “world of physical things”.

**[266]** The things have everywhere within the **concrete experiential world** **predicates of mental meaning**, related to subjects occupying themselves through their acts with things or having occupied themselves, and eventually have given <them> an origin – we could say a “personally founded” [origin] – within these “mental predicates”. We deconstruct these predicates in an abstractive way, without question thus as to in how far such predicates necessarily belong to a surrounding world, - as they by the way do, as can be discerned without much ado.

3) The experienced is conscious to us within the experiencing, eventually within the perceiving, as **being**; it is accepted by us, the experiencing, as being, that is, the experiencing itself implies from the Ego a “positing of being”, the “belief” in being. A world is “there” for us, being [for us], only by way of experiencing and from this belief. But this belief can modalize itself, the certainty of being can change into doubt, etc. “The world” is and the things are obviously accepted by us prior to all theoretical thinking not merely from experience in general, but the world, **meant as “truly and actually being”, is the consequence of experience verifying itself**, unity of acceptance in an ideal consequence of harmoniously proceeding experience **testifying** itself as **being**.[[5]](#footnote-5) Thus we presuppose ideally that such a continuous unity of harmonious experiential acting will be retained through all single cancellations of experience, the way it has been retained <up till now>.

We are now able to connect our description and essential consideration with this **idea**, and we do this without further ado, where we wish to talk of the world’s essence, and of a possible world in general, and [wish] to explore this. There may be questions as to the structural necessities of something experienced of a thing and of the world within the experiencing itself, and without any restriction to the idea thus, that the experience might belong to an ideal system of *in infinitum* proceeding harmony of the experiencing self-verification, but here we prefer something experienced within this idea. Then thus the investigation is directed towards the **Apriori of the experiential world** in general which we gain from the example of the de facto experienced [world], but with the idea that this initially has a pure experiential truth as being experienced, **[267]** [that] it would persist *in infinitum* as being the same experienced and in constant confirmation, in either actual or possible experience (of the experiential act freely to be brought into play). And this presupposition then has to remain being accepted within the variation for each world considered as being changed.

4) Before we approach the Apriori that needs to be considered first, the [Apriori] of the mere things, we remove from these not only the predicates of personal meaningfulness, but also such predicates like the changing **emotional predicates**; that is, we do not only mean the **active valuations** here, the active liking or disliking, the active appreciating, valuing as beautiful, as charming, etc. but the **characters of mood** emerging without active contribution of the experiencing subjects, and likewise all **characters of compulsive, instinctive or any other charm** they perform, and thus in general the wide content of experiential moments which we do not attribute to the things themselves although they present themselves in any such moments, be it occasionally or necessarily. If we thus speak of the **thing itself**, which is in determinations changing from moment to moment, and remains **the same** within their change (in the change of physical states), with the same properties belonging to it which only particularize themselves in states, then we already have an attitude in which all that “subjective” is ignored. Things which “are” there within the presupposed harmony of experience have their experienced and continuously experienceable “**essence**”, a proper “what it is” belonging to the “**thing itself**”; and only that changing within this “what” comes into question in which identical properties, united to a persisting essence evince themselves. Within an experienceable changing “what” a **lasting** “what” evinces itself and is experienced, the **property**-what within the “what” of the states. This is inseparable from that one if something physical is experienced at all. That which concerns the mood, the sad and the cheerful of a landscape for example, or the character of conspicuity within the thing, the foreign, etc., does not belong to the **thing itself**. And not simply <not> because it is something changing as such. It does not belong to the identical thing itself in its identity of the property’s being thus within the changing being thus of the states. There is something **contingent** within the change of the feeling, the “subjective” tone, deeming possible and the like, **[268]** which could have been otherwise, whereas that of the states and of the properties would have remained the same, and thereby the thing “itself”.

5) To the subjective which remains unconsidered within a focusing on pure physicalness, also all **subjective modes of appearance** do belong, in which each thing already presents itself after suspending of the subjective that has just been described: its changing perspectives, the differences of orientation as spatial and temporal [orientation], and everything else which would have to be mentioned in this regard. Thus the here and there, the now and just-has-been, the perspective of the shape and the perspective of colors, etc.

If we delimit the thing and thus the whole thing world abstractively in this way, that is, purely as that which is to be experienced in harmonious experience in selfhood, and within its individual own essence, then we have gained the **idea “mere nature”**. The idea of an “apriori aesthetics” then belongs to it, or – as we can say – of an **ontology of an experienced nature in general**, the way it universally testifies itself within (harmonious) experience, or rather, would testify itself. The whole culture world now is in a certain way gone from the world; we make ourselves – thematically – blind for it. But not just that.

We have excluded **all** “merely” subjective thematically. We could have distinguished from the very beginning thus:

The things present themselves within experience in changing ways. But we distinguish that which belongs to the thing itself in infinite connection of actual and possible harmonious experience as being its own, that is, that which cannot in any way be separated from it and thought away – as long as we keep it as **the same** experienceable -, from that which respectively indeed belongs to it within experience, that is, to the subject, yet not as his own, but simply just subjectively, as piece of content of the “how it is experienced”.

But this does not say that apart from that which belongs to the property of the thing itself and the physical world, anything **subjective** does not belong to it in unconditional necessity, whether it was in the way of any emotions and moods (to which we also count the “being indifferent” as, though neutral, an attunement of the mood), or in the way of perspectivity. More concisely: Some do not have any special relation to the certain **[269]** particularity of the thing (in its abstraction as thing of possible experience as such). The change e.g. of emotional colorings stands within nature in extra-essential relation to the thing itself, the way it “is in itself”, and the way it can be experienced by me in its peculiarity as being the same at different times and as the same by anyone within the community. In contrast to that the **perspectives** have an **essential connection** **to the thing within its physical nature**: If I consider it to be experienced by whomever and whenever, thus also by me whenever, then I am, and the experiencing ones in general are bound to one and the same connection of perspectives. Each thing is necessarily experienced in perspectives having an inner-essential relation to physical determinations of their own as those “presenting” themselves within these perspectives; and everyone who is supposed to have experienced the thing’s same property, and in consequent demonstration, has to experience it in the same perspective connections like those which present simply this and no other particularity. The **possible necessity of the subjective modes of the emotions’ kind**, inhering especially to the single things or (temporally) as moods to all things of my or our common experience as such, thus mostly consists in any system of eidetic laws demanding it, that – however such characters may change individually and within communication, in general change within the harmony of actual and possible experience, within the different experiences of the same – still **any** such characters must be there, whereby their determinacy instead of being bound by the peculiarity of the thing itself would be bound according to possible eidetic laws, which lead into the connections of all else subjective, into which that which is included in its ownness is woven by experience, and at first by the necessary ways of appearance.

By letting pure nature emerge abstractively we have also exhibited a realm of the **physical-subjective** woven into the pure natural thing as correlate, - simply thereby that we had to point out in an abstracting way to that which is there as well within the concrete world experience, but as that from which one should thematically distance oneself. Within **this** subjective at first a separation thrust itself into the fore between that eidetic necessity, being especially related to the experiential own being of pure nature (we are going to purely and simply speak of “nature” from now on) as the “manifold” of its “presentations” – the constitutive subjective of nature -, and to the other subjectives, the special origins of which within the connection of the experiencing subjectivity remain in question.

Before we use this separation we proceed in trying to **sort the abstractions** and the questions coming from them.

6) How about the counterpart of the abstraction of the first level: things and **subjects**? – Possibly it would have been better to distinguish: things and human beings (like I, the experiencing, am a man), and animals that are gradually analogous to men, <that> at least, like them, are subjects having experiences and a certain experiential community with us human beings. Men and animals, in general: **Animate beings** as objects of mundane experience have their own sense which we again can separate from all subjective by the experiential “how” in which they present themselves to “us”, us human beings, who are experienced as experiencing the same world, the way I experience the world, and [who] are experienced, or rather, experienceable as beings with whom I, the experiencing (and then every other experiencing likewise), communicate or am able to communicate concerning the identical experienced. Insofar as the same holds true for animals we call them “**higher animals**”. With regard to the intersubjective world of experience they are then communalized with us, although not therefore regarding the possibility of what higher grade acts are actualized and to be actualized among us men in the specific sense.

Animate beings as **objects** are experienced as in a certain way psychically living beings, that is, as such [beings] living within “their body”, exclusively by way of their “psychic”, that is, **as subjects** related to objects of the other universal surrounding world. Subjects as such are not only experienced as being in the world, but also **experienced** by their surrounding world **as experiencing**. And each subject experiences itself – which is itself an intersubjective experience – as experiencing the world, whereby it finds itself eventually as an experiencing worldly object as well. Each subject, we can say, “psychically” experiences into the world, [and] is now “directed” towards the surrounding world in the pregnant sense, as experiencing, in beginning and proceeding **[271]** cognition, now it has conscious the outer world in a wider sense through experiential appearances, <it is able> to see it, hear [it], etc., without paying attention to it, and to be occupied with it in an experiencing-acting way. Subjects do not only have such a regarding, perceiving or memorially intuitional “consciousness of” something worldly, but also [they do have] other consciousness of such things, e.g. a significative being-related-to within an empty thinking being tied to some indicating being present, or else within a thinking of a higher sense we call “logical”, etc.

Also the **human practice**, the operating into, and not only imagining into and experiencing into, belongs to this psychic <or>, like one also says from understandable reasons – not without any danger by the way -, “inner”, “according to consciousness”, “intentional” being related to the surrounding world. The practical affecting things belonging to the surrounding world (to push them, shove, form them artistically)changes the commonly experienced surrounding world, that is, the affected world objects, although also the inner affecting can be practical intention which does not attain the intended change of object. But not all inner activity (and even passivity, understood as having conscious something worldly in a non-active way by the Ego) affects a change within the intended object of its own sense, and of its property determinacies. Thus not the merely experiencing being active, within active perceiving.

Now the **animate organism** does play a special role here. All perceiving is accomplished in the way of a special being-consciously-active-within the-body: members of the body, called “organs”, <or> move the whole body, <touch> something, move the eyes, etc., but possibly also acting by “walking”. To this inner, subjective “moving” corresponds a change in an objective-worldly way which again is called “motion” (of the body). Thereby mere perception is such an inner motion of the body, whereby simply normally – purely spoken within the frame of experience – no objective change of the perceived object does emerge, whereas it still shows itself occasionally. At any rate, it is then simply not a pure perceptual activity. Yet the body does not only function as perceptual organ (or rather <as> multiplicity of single organs comprised therein as to [becoming] one organ). Rather, **all** subject’s psychic affecting his surrounding world, i.e., his **[272]** world objects external to him, necessarily takes place by way of transferring the subjective affecting to his animate organism. We can now **abstract** from every human beings and animal, as object within the world, **its psychic internality**, its having conscious in the form of passivity and activity. Then its body is reduced to a **mere thing**, and all determinations of the specific bodiliness – like that it has perceptional organs, and as a whole is an organ, that it functions as an organ of actions (of actions in the common sense) changing the surrounding world at the same time – are omitted and thereby of course all the somatic psychic, the living-psychically-within-the-body of the subject. Obviously the natural abstraction results in a **natural thing**, only **conspicuous through a set of types corresponding to it in apeculiar way**, simply that [set of types] characterizing an **organism** (viewed in a purely physical way), and which obviously according to the level of similarity with human bodiliness gives a clue for the interpretation of an organism as being an animatedly living one. (The plants then, insofar as they are to be included into this analogy, come under the widest concept of *animal*.) Thus only one class would be conspicuous within the abstractive focusing on nature among the other natural objects by way of a conspicuous set of types as human animate bodies, and from there a wide line of related types, all eventually comprehended under the type “organism”.

<§3. Totality of Nature and totality of Mind. The lack of a closed experienced unity of all subjective. The universality of the subjective ways of appearance and the own-essentially closed psychic internality of the bodies)

We thus thereby just gain the totality of nature as the universe of all natural things, which soon shows itself on closer consideration as a really combined and at the same time open multiplicity.

In contrast to this now stands the totality of mind. Why are we reluctant to use this word? Why does it not occur within the language, within life, or purely in a sense which cannot be in question here at all? Indeed there is a good reason. The thematical abstraction of the totality of nature results in a self-contained and thematically **[273]** to be explored structure of the concretely complete experiential world, the world in which we live, operate, create, the world which is not “deconstructed” by any artificial abstractions, and “skinned” of all “merely subjective”. But what now remains, the whole being extra-thematic hereby, is **not a unity of the subjective** which would likewise be as an experiential-“world”, as a totality of mind, as a mental **all**, a similarly closed experiential unity, thematically to be treated likewise or similarly as the science of nature or in eidetic attitude an experiential ontology of nature.

As soon as we <climb> over the thematic walls, which we were able to define firmly with regard to nature – and we were not the first, since this was the great deed of modern natural science, and [it was] that which gave it its own sense, and enabled to build up these walls -, as soon as we even climb over these walls and question something external of the same to make it a theme for its part, we are at a loss.

The **non-natural**, the **mentality**, prevails everywhere within the concrete experiential world, it attaches to everything but in a very different way. Let us consider. Led by the previous obviously emerges:

1) All natural objects have in the same way their manifold constitutive “ways of appearance” within the experience, in which alone we want to consider them, and beyond that many subjective modes of a kind which is contingent from the standpoint of their objective peculiarity.

2) This also concerns the **bodies** as natural objects thus. But a subjectivity of a completely different kind does belong to the bodies which we call “**psychic “internality**””, if we look over the wall delimiting the animate body, and if we now ask from the mere bodiliness, what “makes” them [the bodies] be a <man>, this man, this animal. Thereby we are confronted with a certainly self-contained unity of each “internality” belonging to the body. And <we find> all “internally” psychic in a peculiar way **centered** under the title “Ego”. A word is missing here which is sufficiently clear and general and expressed and expressing without special relatednesses. Such an Ego-centering belongs to each body, also to the animal [body], and a general form of structure, thus encompassing all psychic, **[274]** according to which one and the same Ego of this body lives within a manifold Ego-life, while each such life has the character of the I-related, I-centered **intentionality** (consciousness-of). This intentionality partly is an active activity radiating from the Ego-center, from the Ego which remains identical (I experience, I think, I wish, I want, etc.), partly [it is] affection towards the Ego-center, from the medium of an intentionality which in a certain sense is sleeping and constitutes a “dark” passive base of life, never separated from the Ego-center, and still according to single moments changing towards affection and then possibly reacting action. Yet the Egos are not merely union-points for their life, according to experience they also have their “abilities”, their **habitualities**, their lasting cognitions, lasting experiential convictions, intellectual convictions, convictions of the will (resolutions), etc., in short, in a first sense they are personal Egos.

Anyway we have something **own-essentially closed here, yet something special for each body**, that is – speaking in **Leibniz’** way – we arrive at the souls as **monads**. But within the universal frame of the experienced world we have the many however “interwoven” things, among them the many bodies and “at” them, and still in a quite special sense, a not physical [sense], “attached to” them the corresponding souls, or rather subjects, personal Egos.

1. May 1926. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. But something similar <is accepted> for all our actions with regard to the existent world. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. To create more clarity. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Subjects = Men and animals. Compare 5). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. It is simply stated here that we want to designate the world of harmonious experience by „world pure and simple“. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)